Les annales de droits linguistiques - 2016 - Observatoire international des droits linguistiques

Les annales de droits linguistiques - 2016

Bon nombre de textes qui portent sur les droits linguistiques au Canada sont publiés ici et là. Certes, la Revue de droit linguistique contribue à rassembler en un seul endroit la littérature à ce sujet, mais des articles académiques sont tout de même publiés dans des revues à vocation générale; les ouvrages sont publiés par diverses maisons d’éditions, les décisions des tribunaux sont également publiées dans des recueils de jurisprudence à vocation général, puisqu’il n’existe aucun recueil thématique au sujet des droits linguistiques.

Par conséquent, il nous paraissait essentiel de rassembler en un seul endroit l’information au sujet de ces publications. Les annales de droits linguistiques recensent donc les décisions des tribunaux, les ouvrages, les articles de périodiques, les modifications législatives qui portent sur les droits linguistiques au Canada, les rapports des Commissaires linguistiques et autres études ou rapports sur le sujet. Il convient toutefois de noter que, malgré tous les efforts que nous avons déployés, cette liste peut être incomplète.

I – LES DÉCISIONS JUDICIAIRES

A – LE CANADA

Lakeland Bank c. Never E Nuff (Le), 2016 CF 1096, [2016] A.C.F. no 1093 (QL)
Cour fédérale

Les plaidoiries, la preuve et l’argumentation de M. Saint-Germain étaient en français. Les autres parties ont plaidé en anglais. L’article 20 de la Loi sur les langues officielles dispose que les décisions définitives sont simultanément mises à la disposition du public dans les deux langues officielles lorsque les débats se sont déroulés, en tout ou en partie, dans les deux langues officielles. Cependant, l’article continue en prévoyant qu’un jugement peut être rendu d’abord dans une langue si l’établissement d’une version bilingue entraînait, entre autres, une injustice ou un inconvénient grave à une des parties au litige. Comme les parties ont hâte qu’une décision soit rendue le plus rapidement possible, elles ont convenu que le jugement est d’abord rendu dans une langue puis suivi de sa traduction. Il convient de mentionner qu’une situation semblable s’est présentée dans la décision The Phoenix Sun, précitée. Cette décision a été rendue le 26 mai 2016. La traduction n’est pas encore disponible. (para 72)

Mr. St-Germain’s pleadings, evidence and submissions were in French. The other parties pleaded in English. Section 20 of the Official Languages Act provides a final judgment should be issued simultaneously in both English and French when the proceedings were conducted in whole or in part in both official languages. However, the section goes on to provide that a judgment may be first issued in one language if simultaneous publication would, among other things, result in an injustice or hardship to any party. The parties are most anxious to have a decision rendered as soon as possible and so agreed that it first be issued in one language, with a translation to follow. It should be noted that a similar situation arose in The Phoenix Sun, above. That decision was rendered May 26, 2016. A translation is not yet available.

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Alani c. Canada (Premier Ministre) , 2016 CF 1139, [2016] A.C.F. no 1253 (QL)
Cour fédérale

Dans la mesure où cette décision implique une requête accessoire et non le bien-fondé de la demande de contrôle judiciaire, je conclus qu’elle ne concerne pas une question qui présente de l’intérêt ou de l’importance pour le public. Par conséquent, cette décision ne relève pas de l’alinéa 20(1)a) de la Loi sur les langues officielles, L.R.C. (1985), ch. 31 (4e suppl.), et je la publie uniquement en anglais. (para 26)

As this decision involves an ancillary motion, not the merits of the application for judicial review, I find that it does not relate to a question of general public interest or importance. Therefore, this decision does not fall within s 20(1)(a) of the Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp), so I am releasing it in English only.

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B – LES PROVINCES

Colombie-Britannique

Conseil-scolaire francophone de la Colombie- Britannique v. British Columbia (Education), 2016 BCSC 1764, [2016] B.C.J. No. 2007 (QL)

Cour suprême de la Colombie-Britannique

The plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees minority language education to certain categories of Francophones where the numbers so warrant.

Here, I will summarize, in brief, my conclusions concerning the plaintiffs’ most important arguments. To the extent any of my conclusions in this summary differ from the conclusions in the balance of the decision, the conclusions elsewhere in the decision take precedence.

I find that s. 166.25(9) of the School Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412 which restricts admission to CSF schools to s. 23 rightsholders and the children of non-citizens who would otherwise be rightsholders is not contrary to s. 23 of the Charter. That questions was decided in Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, and I am bound by that decision.

The plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to three types of discrete resources and facilities: increased funding pursuant to the Annual Facilities Grant, increased funding for transportation and space for early childhood education.

The plaintiffs have not shown that the CSF is disadvantaged by the way in which the Annual Facilities Grant is calculated. However, I find that the Province breached s. 23 by failing to apply the AFG Rural Factor to the CSF in 2008/09, 2009/10 and 2010/11. The Ministry treated the CSF differently from majority boards despite recognizing that it might not be appropriate to do so. However, I find that breach is reasonably justified in a free and democratic society.

With respect to most rights breaches, I find that declarations are the most appropriate remedy. Where the Province’s laws and policies materially contributed to a rights breach, I declare them to be contrary to s. 23 and/or make a declaration delineating what rightsholders are entitled to. Where the CSF is responsible, I make a declaration affirming the CSF’s jurisdiction to remedy the situation. However, to ensure those remedies are effective, I make two further orders in support of the CSF. (para 1-5, 24)

Yamba v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2016 BCCA 219, [2016] B.C.J. No. 1028 (QL)
Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique

Mr. Yamba takes the position that the right to a French trial provided for in s. 530 of the Criminal Code, combined with the official language rights in s. 16 of the Charter, elevates the right to a French trial in Canada to the equivalent of a constitutional right. Mr. Yamba argues that the Minister’s conclusion that access to a certified translator will address concerns regarding trial fairness in the United States does not give "due consideration" to the language rights Mr. Yamba has in Canada.

In my view, it was reasonable for the Minister to conclude that the assistance of a certified translator will address Mr. Yamba’s concerns regarding trial fairness in the United States. The use of a translator will ensure the integrity of the fact-finding process. With the assistance of a translator Mr. Yamba will be able to understand what is transpiring in court, consult with and instruct counsel and, if Mr. Yamba elects to do so, testify in a responsive manner. (para 18, 25)

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Nouveau-Brunswick

R. c. Brideau, 2016 NBBR 197, [2016] A.N.-B. no 239 (QL)
Cour du Banc de la Reine du N.-B.

Toutefois, le juge a déclaré inadmissible le témoignage identifiant formellement le défendeur que l’agent de conservation principal Paul Turcotte avait présenté à l’audience au motif qu’il y avait eu violation des droits du prévenu de communiquer dans la langue de son choix qui lui sont garantis par la Loi sur les langues officielles du Nouveau-Brunswick, L.N.-B. 2002, ch. O-0.5.		However, the judge excluded the in-court identification evidence positively identifying the defendant as testified to by lead conservation officer Paul Turcotte because of a breach of the language choice rights guaranteed under the Official Languages Act of New Brunswick S.N.B. 2002, ch. O-0.5 (the Act). Indeed, at the time Conservation Officer Paul Turcotte identified the defendant in the courtroom, as the first officer to testify for the Crown, counsel for the defendant, Mr. LeBlanc, admitted identity. (Transcript, Volume 1, page 74, Line 10 -- Page 75, Line 4, hereinafter T. v.1, p. 74, l. 10, p. 75, l. 4))
La preuve a été déclarée inadmissible car après avoir intercepté le véhicule conduit par le défendeur et avoir mis ce dernier en état d’arrestation au motif qu’il chassait la nuit, en ayant auparavant observé une lumière éblouissante provenant de l’intérieur ou des alentours du véhicule dont le défendeur était le seul occupant et entendu un appeau d’orignal à deux reprises distinctes alors qu’ils observaient le même véhicule en train d’approcher, les agents qui ont procédé à l’arrestation, qui ne parlaient couramment que l’anglais, ont été incapables de lui accorder le droit de recevoir des communications en français comme il l’avait immédiatement demandé. Comme je l’ai indiqué, il a fallu attendre dix-sept minutes après l’immobilisation du véhicule pour que cela se produise.		The reason for the exclusion of the evidence was that, upon stopping the vehicle driven by the defendant and arresting him for hunting at night, after having watched a bright light shone from inside or near the vehicle in which the defendant was the sole occupant, and having heard a moose call being used on two separate occasions as they watched the same vehicle approach, the arresting officers, being fluent only in English, could not accord him his right to be dealt with in French as he had requested immediately. As noted, that did not occur for seventeen minutes after the stop.
Le juge du procès a-t-il convenablement appliqué les principes du cadre d’analyse constitutionnel aux obligations imposées aux agents de conservation d’accorder à tout citoyen néo-brunswickois le droit à l’emploi du français ou de l’anglais pour communiquer avec les institutions du gouvernement comme le prévoient laLoi sur les langues officielles et la Charte? Si les droits de M. Brideau ont été violés, le juge du procès a-t-il exercé comme il se devait le pouvoir discrétionnaire qui lui permet d’écarter à la fois les éléments de preuve relatifs à l’identité et les éléments de preuve matériels que constituaient les pièces à conviction saisies?		Did the trial judge properly apply the constitutional analytic framework principles to the conservation officers’ obligations to accord any New Brunswick citizen the right to deal with the institutions of government in their choice of French or English pursuant to the Act and the Charter? If the rights of Mr. Brideau were breached did the trial judge properly apply the discretion accorded him to exclude both the identity evidence as well as the real evidence in the form of the seized exhibits from the evidence?
Cependant, ce qui différencie selon moi la présente instance de l’affaire Losier, c’est essentiellement le fait que les agents ont continué à recueillir des éléments de preuve contre le défendeur alors détenu dans cette affaire pendant que la violation de son droit de communiquer dans la langue de son choix continuait, et ensuite le fait que cette violation s’est poursuivie pendant trente minutes. Ce n’est pas ce qui s’est produit dans la présente instance et de fait, les agents ont semblé essayer de respecter le droit de M. Brideau d’être servi dans la langue de son choix avant d’aller plus loin dans leur enquête. Dans le cas présent, la durée de la violation a été inférieure de moitié et les agents ont pris délibérément la décision de ne recueillir aucun élément de preuve contre le défendeur pendant la période en question.		However, what I believe differentiates this case from Losier is principally the officers continued to gather evidence against the detained defendant in that case while the violation of the accused’s language continued and secondly the violation continued for thirty minutes. In this case that did not happen and indeed the officers appeared to be attempting to respect Mr. Brideau’s right to be served in the language of his choice before any steps were taken to continue their investigation. In this instance the violation went on for only half that time and the officers made a deliberate decision not gather evidence against the defendant during that period of time.
Ayant à l’esprit l’avertissement de la juge en chef McLachlin quant à la nécessité d’adopter une approche téléologique et libérale pour analyser les droits constitutionnels, et de procéder à une interprétation libérale de ces droits, je ne peux accepter que, dans les circonstances de la présente instance, le retard de dix-sept minutes dont il a été question justifiait le rejet de la preuve d’identité et des deux appeaux d’orignal électroniques qui avaient été saisis.		Bearing in mind Chief Justice McLachlin’s admonition of taking both a purposive and generous approach to constitutional rights analysis, and allowing for generous interpretation of those rights, I cannot agree that a seventeen minute delay in the circumstances of this case as described warranted a rejection of the evidence of identity and the two seized electronic moose calls.
Pour les motifs qui précèdent, je conclus que la preuve d’identité n’aurait pas dû être écartée, de la même façon que les appeaux d’orignal électroniques n’auraient pas dû être déclarés inadmissibles en vertu par. 24(2) de la Charte, et ce, même si les droits linguistiques que garantissent laLoi sur les langues officielles et la Charte avaient été violés, ne serait-ce que pendant une courte période. (para 3, 5, 28, 42,43 et 56)		For the above reasons, I find that the evidence of identity should not have been excluded, nor should the electronic moose calls have been excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter even although the language rights guaranteed by the Act and the Charter were violated if only for a short time. (para 3, 5, 28, 42,43 and 56)

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Ontario

R. v. Wilkins, 2016 ONSC 2966, [2016] O.J. No. 2340
Cour supérieure de justice de l’Ontario

The applicant is an English-speaking accused. He is charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of a drug called buprenorphine. He applies pursuant to s. 638(1)(f) of the Criminal Code to challenge each prospective juror for cause on the basis that they do not speak the official language of Canada in which his trial is to be held. In this case that language is English.

Although the accused would be tried in English in this jurisdiction absent an election by him to have his trial conducted in French, he requested and obtained an order pursuant to s. 530(1) of the Criminal Code from the judge presiding at his preliminary inquiry directing that his trial be conducted in English.

The accused submits that because he has obtained an order pursuant to s. 530(1) he is automatically entitled to challenge each prospective juror for cause pursuant to s. 638(1)(f) without showing more.

Alternatively, having filed census data which shows that this region of Ontario is very multicultural and that the "mother tongue" of over 45 percent of the population is neither English nor French, he submits that by that evidence, in combination with the s. 530(1) order, he has shown enough to permit a challenge for cause of each prospective juror in respect of their ability to speak and understand English.

On the facts of this case I conclude that the application is animated by concerns about trial fairness and not by concerns about the accused’s right to equal access to justice in the official language of Canada of his choice. This is significant because s. 638(2) specifies that: "No challenge for cause shall be allowed on a ground not mentioned in subsection (1)." A challenge for cause on the basis of language competence does not fit within any of the other clauses of s. 638(1).

Taking a purposive approach and recognizing that language rights are substantive in nature, I conclude that s. 638(1)(f) was enacted to assist in ensuring that an accused having a trial anywhere in Canada has a full opportunity to have their trial conducted in the official language of their choice or, in appropriate cases, a bilingual trial, where that would not occur in the normal course in the jurisdiction where the trial is to be held. In enacting s. 638(1)(f) Parliament recognized that, in circumstances where s. 530 is being put to its intended use, some additional tools must be available to ensure that equality of access to justice in either official language is achieved. Section 638(1)(f) does not authorize a procedure by which an accused, who will have a trial in the official language of their choice in the normal course, may question prospective jurors about trial fairness issues related to their language competence. That is how the accused is trying to use the provision in this case and I conclude that it is a misuse of the provision, although well intentioned.

(para 2, 4, 10, 11, 26, 27)