[5]             The Applicants bring the within Application in Court seeking declarations that, by failing to declare the Acadian Region of Chéticamp as an exceptional electoral district, under paragraph 5 (5B) (e) of the Act, the Respondent violated section 3 and subsection 16(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11, Part I (“Charter”), as well as section 2 of the French-language Services Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 26 (“FLSA”), and “proceeded in a manner inconsistent with the normative unwritten principle regarding the respect of minorities defined in the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion in Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 217”.

[...]

[135]    For the reasons noted, I find that the decision of the Commission to reject an exceptional electoral district for Chéticamp infringed s. 3 of the Charter because of one or both of the following:

1.	the Majority Members took the wrong approach in the balancing exercise, as they balanced voter parity against effective representation, or they assigned too much weight to voter parity because they buttressed it with an unspecified risk of voter dilution; or,
2.	the decision was arrived at and rendered in an unreasoned and arbitrary manner.

[136]    The Legislature passed legislation fully implementing the Commission’s recommendation unchanged. That legislative process does not erase the Charterinfringement which was implemented. Therefore, the House of Assembly’s acceptance of the Commission’s recommendation not to declare Chéticamp an exceptional electoral district, under paragraph 5 (5B) (e) of the House of Assembly Act, also infringes s. 3 of the Charter.


[...]

[163]    For the foregoing reasons, I:

1.	Conclude and declare that the House of Assembly’s acceptance of the Commission’s recommendation not to declare Chéticamp an exceptional electoral district under paragraph 5 (5B) (e) of the House of Assembly Act, infringes s. 3 of the Charter and the infringement is not justified under s. 1;
2.	Declare, pursuant to s. 52 of the Charter, that s. 4 of the House of Assembly Actis of no force and effect; and,
3.	Pursuant to subs. 24(1) of the Charter suspend the effect of this declaration until July 15, 2026, allowing s. 4 of the House of Assembly Act to remain provisionally in place during the period of suspension.

[...]

[12] The Conseil submits that, once it is established that the witness has greater facility in a language other than English, good faith is the only remaining issue, citing passages in the cases such as the following statement by Marzari J. in Ai Kang Yi at para. 38:

… I [accept] the many authorities that recognize that, in the absence of establishing bad faith, witnesses are entitled to testify in court in their mother tongue: …

[13] While it is usually the case that, in the absence of bad faith, a witness will be permitted to testify in their mother tongue through an interpreter, I read Tran as requiring a more nuanced analysis. Giving judgment for the Court, Chief Justice Lamer states that the first step is to determine whether there is need for an interpreter. Need is not necessarily established by the fact that the witness’ mother tongue is not English. Determining whether interpretation is needed engages a substantive judicial assessment, to be approached with generosity and open mindedness. If interpretation is requested, the judge must consider whether the request is justified; Tran at para. 48. While the threshold is low, the onus is on the party requesting interpretation.

[14] In conducting its assessment, the court must consider the purposes served by s. 14. The objective is “linguistic understanding” in aid of the search for truth (Tran at para. 39), but fairness and the integrity of the adjudicative process are also at stake. The court must consider both sides of the coin: whether interpretation will afford the witness an inappropriate advantage, and whether its absence risks putting the witness at a disadvantage. In Tran at para. 40, Lamer C.J. states that: … the principle of linguistic understanding which underpins the right to interpreter assistance should not be elevated to the point where those with difficulty communicating in or comprehending the language of the proceedings, be it English or French, are given or seen to be given unfair advantages over those who are fluent in the court's language. Ultimately, the purpose of the right to interpreter assistance is to create a level and fair playing field, not to provide some individuals with more rights than others.

[15] The most obvious unfair advantage afforded a witness testifying through an interpreter is a potential blunting of effective cross-examination; Mee Hoi Bros at para. 18; Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: The Law of Evidence in Canada, 6th ed. (Lederman, Fuerst, Stewart eds.), para. 16.58, citing cases dating back to R. v. Burke (1858), 8 Cox. C.C. 44 at 46-47.

[16] While the cases do not emphasize this point, in my view, it is also necessary to consider the potential effect of interpretation on the court’s truth-seeking function and the integrity of the adjudicative process. Interpretation is necessarily imprecise. It is often awkward and may lead to confusion in the back-and-forth between counsel, interpreter, and witness. It is time-consuming. All of these features of interpretation were evident during Mr. Allison’s testimony on the voir dire. They are inherent to interpretation, and not the fault of the interpreters, who were competent and thoroughly professional.

[17] Tran was a case involving an accused person whose mother tongue was Vietnamese. The Conseil submits that the threshold for interpretation must be lower in the case of a native francophone witness testifying in a trial conducted in English, to the point that the francophone witness could only be denied interpretation on proof of bad faith, because French is constitutionally recognized as an official language of Canada, and Charter values require the recognition of its special status and character; Charter, ss. 16-23; R v. Beaulac, 1999 CanLII 684, [1999] 1 SCR 768 at 786-77 (S.C.C.); Commission scolaire francophone des Territoires du Nord-Ouest v. Northwest Territories (Education, Culture and Employment), 2023 SCC 31. In R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2024 SCC 16 at para. 115, the Court cited Beaulac as cautioning against any analysis tending to restrict the language rights of bilingual Canadians, such as Mr. Allison.

[18] I am not persuaded that the right to interpretation under s. 14 of the Charter applies differently in the case of a native francophone or anglophone than it would for anyone else. Section 14 exists to level the playing field in a court proceeding. If the playing field is level without interpretation, then interpretation is unnecessary. It would undermine the proper administration of justice in a civil suit in British Columbia to afford interpretation to a native francophone, because they are a francophone, that would be denied to a similarly situated witness whose mother tongue was different.

[19] To summarize, where interpretation is requested, the court must consider linguistic facility and also the secondary question of the motive for the request, approaching both with sensitivity and understanding. As to facility, witnesses are usually in a much better position than the court to evaluate their linguistic needs and competencies. The purpose of interpretation is to level the playing field, not to give the witness an advantage not possessed by other witnesses. The court must consider whether interpretation is necessary, bearing in mind what it may entail for the proper administration of justice in the case at hand. As to motive, a request motivated by a desire to gain advantage or some other oblique motive will be refused, but the evidence of an oblique motive must be clear and compelling.

[1]           Les demandeurs demandent l’annulation de la nomination de la très honorable Mary Simon comme Gouverneure générale du Canada, parce qu’ils prétendent que la personne qui assume cette charge doit pouvoir communiquer en français et en anglais, en vertu des droits linguistiques prévus aux articles 16(1) et 20(1) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. 

[2]           Le Procureur général du Canada (« PGC ») conteste cette prétention qu’il estime manifestement infondée en droit. Il prétend aussi que les demandeurs n’ont pas l’intérêt requis pour agir. Pour ces motifs, il demande le rejet de la demande au stade préliminaire. Subsidiairement, il demande le rejet partiel de la demande, à l’égard du rapport du Groupe consultatif sur la sélection du gouverneur général et de l’avis du premier ministre du Canada. Il soutient que ce rapport et cet avis ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une réparation judiciaire.

[3]           La demande en irrecevabilité est rejetée, sauf à l’égard de Feu Frédéric Bastien. L’absence de fondements juridiques n’est pas suffisamment manifeste, de sorte que la prudence commande de laisser la demande en jugement déclaratoire procéder au fond. De plus, la citoyenneté canadienne d’Étienne-Alexis Boucher lui procure l’intérêt pour agir à l’égard de la légalité de la nomination de la Gouverneure générale du Canada. Les organisations demanderesses obtiennent un délai afin de corriger l’insuffisance de leurs allégations au sujet de leur intérêt pour agir. 

[...] 

[15]        La demande en jugement déclaratoire repose sur les articles 16(1) et 20(1)de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. Le premier stipule que le français et l’anglais sont les langues officielles du Canada et qu’elles possèdent un statut, des droits et des privilèges égaux quant à leur usage dans les institutions du Parlement et du gouvernement du Canada. Le second garantit le droit du public d’utiliser le français ou l’anglais pour communiquer avec les institutions fédérales et pour en recevoir les services.

[...] 

[17]        Les parties s’affrontent au sujet de l’interprétation du contenu et de la portée de ces articles.

[18]        Selon le PGC, il est manifeste que ni l’une ni l’autre de ces dispositions n’exige que le gouverneur général soit capable de s’exprimer personnellement en français et en anglais. 

[19]        Selon les demandeurs, la personne et l’institution se confondent dans le cas du gouverneur général, de sorte que le bilinguisme du titulaire de la charge est indispensable pour assurer le respect des droits linguistiques prévus aux articles 16(1) et 20(1) de la Charte.

[20]        Pour avoir gain de cause au stade de l’irrecevabilité, le PGC doit démontrer que l’interprétation des articles 16(1) et 20(1) proposée par les demandeurs est vouée à l’échec.

[...]

[31]        Le contexte social dans lequel s’inscrivent les protections offertes par les articles 16(1) et 20(1) de la Charte est également pertinent dans le cadre de leur interprétation.

[32]        Ainsi, la nécessité que la titulaire de la charge de gouverneure générale soit bilingue pour réaliser le bilinguisme institutionnel ne soulève pas que des enjeux purement juridiques. Cette question fait aussi intervenir des questions factuelles.

[33]        En somme, l’interprétation des articles 16(1) et 20(1) de la Charte ne fait pas l’objet d’un précédent qui apporte une solution complète, certaine et définitive à leur application dans le cas de la gouverneure générale. De plus, à ce stade, le Tribunal ne dispose pas d’un éclairage factuel complet. Il serait donc prématuré de conclure que la demande en jugement déclaratoire est vouée à l’échec. 

[34]        Les demandeurs pourront présenter leurs arguments au juge du fond, sur la base d’une trame factuelle plus complète.

[4]         Despite the significant dispute between the parties, the underlying facts are straightforward. The crux of this matter is the assertion by the Plaintiffs that the Defendants’ changes made to Policy 713: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (“Policy 713”) in the summer of 2023 are unconstitutional and pose a threat to the wellbeing of students as well as volunteers and the community as a whole within the Anglophone East School District. The Plaintiffs maintain the revisions to Policy 713 are unconstitutional. The Plaintiffs filed a preliminary motion on April 2, 2024, requesting an injunction to stay the enforcement of Policy 713 pending an adjudication on the constitutionality of the provisions.

[...]

[92]      None of the Plaintiffs have standing as of right to advance claims under section 7and 15 of the Charter on behalf of gender diverse youth. The Court has determined that none of Harry Doyle, Dominic Vautour or the Anglophone East District Education Council has standing as of right to challenge Policy 713, on the grounds that the self-identification provisions violate the Plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to section 16(1) of the Charter. The Plaintiffs request for public interest is denied. The only claim which remains is Dominic Vautour’s ability to advance a claim that Policy 713 has infringed his section 2(b) Charter rights. 

The Path Forward

[93]      This Court has concluded that none of the Plaintiffs’ individually nor collectively have standing, either as of right or public interest standing to advance a claim that the adoption and implementation of Policy 713 infringes their section 16.1 Charter rights. None of the Plaintiffs have standing as of right to advance the potential infringement of the section 7 or section 15 Charter rights of gender diverse youth. The Court has further concluded this is not a case where it would be appropriate to exercise its discretion and grant the Plaintiffs public interest standing to advance these claims.

INTRODUCTION

Veuillez noter que la cour d'appel du Québec a octtroyé une pemission de faire appel à la décision et que cette décision pourrait être renversé en appel. 

Please note that the Quebec Court of Appeal has granted leave to appeal the decision and that this decision could be overturned on appeal.

Prenez notes que dans cette décision charte signifie Charte de la langue française du Québec. 

Please note that in this decision, charter refers to the Quebec Charter of the French Language.


[47]        Les Demandeurs soutiennent que les obligations linguistiques qui incombent aux CSA aux termes des dispositions de la Charte visées par la demande de sursis portent atteinte à leurs droits protégés par l’article 23 de la Charte canadienne (l’art. 23), en ce qu’elles entravent le droit exclusif de gestion et de contrôle des établissements d’enseignement de la minorité linguistique et nuisent à la préservation de la culture linguistique au sein des établissements.

[48]        Selon eux, les décisions relatives à l'utilisation de la langue de la minorité et d'autres langues par et au sein d’un conseil scolaire de la minorité linguistique sont au cœur de la protection conférée par l'art. 23. Les conseils scolaires de la minorité linguistique ont le pouvoir exclusif de prendre de telles décisions, y compris le droit de créer et de maintenir un environnement dans lequel le personnel, les élèves, les familles et les membres de la communauté peuvent interagir et s'épanouir dans la langue de la minorité^[38].

[...]

[51]        Le litige porte essentiellement sur l’interprétation et l’application de l’article 23 de la Charte canadienne dont il convient d’exposer les principes généraux.

[...]

[54]        Cet article a été maintes fois interprété et sa portée et ses finalités définies par la Cour Suprême du Canada au cours des dernières décennies^[41] dans l’arrêt phare Mahe^[42], et des arrêts subséquents dont Arsenault-Cameron^[43], Solski^[44], et Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique^[45].

[55]        Dans Mahe, la Cour suprême reconnait que le par. 23(3) de la Charte canadiennecomprend le droit pour la minorité linguistique d’exercer une certaine mesure de gestion et de contrôle des établissements qui dispensent l’enseignement dans leur langue. Cette gestion et ce contrôle "sont vitaux pour assurer l’épanouissement de leur langue et de leur culture"^[46].

[56]        L’objet de l’art. 23 vise à favoriser l’épanouissement de la langue de la minorité, la langue étant davantage qu’un moyen de communication, puisqu’elle fait partie intégrante de l’identité et de la culture de la minorité linguistique^[47].

[57]        Selon la Cour Suprême, la langue de la minorité linguistique devrait être la langue utilisée dans le cadre de l’administration et du fonctionnement de l’établissement, ce qui est compatible avec la reconnaissance du fait que les écoles de la minorité linguistique jouent un rôle à la fois comme centres culturels et établissements d’enseignement^[48]. En effet, les écoles de la minorité linguistique ne font pas qu’enseigner la langue, elles servent aussi de centres communautaires où peuvent se dérouler les manifestations culturelles des membres de la minorité^[49]. 

[58]        Selon les Demandeurs, certaines dispositions de la Charte violent l’article 23 de la Charte canadienne en exigeant des CSA qu’elles utilisent exclusivement le français dans leurs contrats, dans leurs communications écrites internes, entre elles, au sein des membres du personnel ou encore avec des entités de la communauté anglophone^[50].

[...]

[63]        À ce stade, l’argument des Demandeurs selon lequel la mise en œuvre des dispositions contestées touche au cœur du droit à la gestion et au contrôle de la langue et de la culture de la minorité linguistique apparaît suffisamment sérieux pour répondre au premier critère.

1.      La population de Sarnia n’a pas assez de francophones pour obtenir un panneau de juré français;

2.      Il y a un manque de personnelle bilingue au Palais de justice à Sarnia; et

3.      L’avocat putatif de M. Paré, Me Rouleau, travaille à Montréal donc un procès à Ottawa serait préférable pour Me Rouleau étant donné qu’Ottawa n’est que 90 minutes de Montréal.

[1]           The accused are charged with two counts pertaining to bribing foreign public officials (s. 3 of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act) and one count of fraud (s. 380 of the Criminal Code).  The Crown has filed a direct indictment and the jury trial is scheduled for three weeks beginning October 28, 2024.  The Court must determine whether, pursuant to section 530(5) of the Criminal Code, the trial should be held in both official languages of Canada.  For the following reasons, the Court concludes that such an order must be made.

[2]           The accused Timothy Heaney and Robert Walsh are anglophones.  On October 12, 2023, they requested to be tried before an English-speaking judge and jury.  The accused René Bélanger is francophone.  On the same date, he requested to be tried before a judge and jury who speak both official languages.  Mr. Bélanger wants his lawyer to be able to plead and be understood in French without the filter of interpretation.  He also wants to be understood in his mother tongue without the filter of interpretation if he decides to testify during the proceedings.

[3]           The Crown submits that the circumstances of this case warrant an order directing that the three accused be tried before a bilingual judge and jury.  The Crown contends that the accused were part of a joint and common enterprise when they allegedly committed the offences for which they are charged.  The Crown argues that the terms and purpose of s. 530 of the Criminal Code and the decisions rendered in Gagnon c. R.^[1] and R. c. Charron^[2] support their argument that the trial must be held before a judge and jury who speak both official languages. 

[...]

530. […]

Circumstances warranting order directing trial in both official languages

(6) The facts that two or more accused who are to be tried together are each entitled to be tried before a justice of the peace, provincial court judge, judge or judge and jury who speak one of the official languages of Canada and that those official languages are different may constitute circumstances that warrant that an order be granted directing that they be tried before a justice of the peace, provincial court judge, judge or judge and jury who speak both official languages of Canada. (Emphasis added)

[7]           A review of the case law relating to this provision reveals that bilingual trials have been ordered in cases where, as in this case, two or more co-accused have requested that their trial be conducted in two different official languages of Canada.  It must be noted that a bilingual trial order does not depend on the consent of the parties but rather on the circumstances of each case.  Section 530 of the Criminal Code states that when deciding if a bilingual trial is warranted, a Court must consider “the circumstances of the case”, including that set out in s. 530(6) as cited above.  Parliament has therefore provided that a bilingual trial may be ordered despite the objection of an accused.

[1]           Le requérant, Douglas Laframboise, demande un arrêt des procédures en vertu de l’alinéa 11 b) de la charte canadienne des droits et libertés alléguant une violation de son droit d’être jugé dans un délai raisonnable.

[...]

d.   DÉLAI ENTRE LE 4 AVRIL 2023 ET LE 18 MAI 2023

[...]

VEUILLEZ NOTER QUE LA COUR D'APPEL DU QUÉBEC À ACCEUILLI UNE DEMANDE D'APPEL (PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL DU QUÉBEC C. PRYDE, 2024 QCCA 1123)
DONC CETTE DÉCISION POURRAIT ÊTRE RENVERSÉ. 


PLEASE NOTE THAT THE QUEBEC COURT OF APPEAL HAS ACCEPTED AN APPLICATION TO APPEAL (PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL DU QUÉBEC C. PRYDE 2024 QCCA 1123).
THEREFORE, THIS DECISION COULD BE OVERTURNED.


[3]           L’accusée a choisi de subir son procès en anglais en vertu de l’article 530 du Code criminel. La procédure est déjà bien entamée. Pendant six jours, entre les mois de novembre 2023 et de janvier 2024, le tribunal a tenu un voir-dire préparatoire au procès concernant la recevabilité de certaines déclarations. Ce débat a donné lieu à un jugement de 65 pages, rédigé en anglais^[119].

[...]

[5]           Le 1^er juin 2022, la Charte de la langue française^[120] a été modifiée par le législateur provincial. Parmi les changements apportés, la Loi sur la langue officielle et commune du Québec, le français^[121] a introduit un nouvel article 10 à la CLF, lequel se lit comme suit : 

10. Une version française doit être jointe immédiatement et sans délai à tout jugement rendu par écrit en anglais par un tribunal judiciaire lorsqu’il met fin à une instance ou présente un intérêt pour le public.

10. A French version shall be attached immediately and without delay to any judgment rendered in writing in English by a court of justice where the judgment terminates a proceeding or is of public interest.

 [Nous soulignons]

[6]           La nouvelle disposition entrera en vigueur le 1^er juin 2024^[122]. Elle s’appliquera donc au jugement final rendu en l’espèce.

[7]           Quelle que soit l’issue du procès (verdict de non-culpabilité, verdict de culpabilité ou autre décision), cette modification exigera de ce tribunal qu’il dépose une traduction française du jugement original en anglais le jour même. En d’autres termes, je ne pourrai pas déposer le jugement final même s’il est prêt.

[8]           Cela signifie que M^me Pryde, la Couronne et la famille d’Irene Dehem devront attendre plusieurs semaines ou mois supplémentaires (cette dernière éventualité étant la plus probable) avant de recevoir le jugement final, lequel, même s’il est prêt bien avant, sera posé sur une tablette en attendant la traduction effectuée par les services du tribunal, traduction qui devra ensuite être révisée, corrigée et approuvée. Pendant ce temps, toutes les parties intéressées se verront refuser la conclusion qu’elles attendent avec impatience depuis la funeste collision survenue en 2021

[...]

5- L’article 10 CLF et les dispositions linguistiques du Code criminel sont-ils incompatibles

[...]
POUR CES MOTIFS, le tribunal :

CONCLUT que les mots « immédiatement et sans délai » employés à l’article 10 sont incompatibles avec la mise en application de la procédure pénale, qui est de compétence fédérale;

CONCLUT que les mots « immédiatement et sans délai » employés à l’article 10 sont incompatibles avec les droits linguistiques fondamentaux prévus à la partie XVII du Code criminel;

CONCLUT que la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale s’applique, de façon telle que les exigences d’immédiateté et de simultanéité de la traduction française ne peuvent s’appliquer dans le cadre de procédures criminelles;

et

DÉCLARE INOPÉRANTS dans le contexte de procédures criminelles les mots « immédiatement et sans délai ».

PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS DECISION WAS RECENTLY OVERTURNED BY THE NEW BRUNSWICK COURT OF APPEAL

[1]         This case involves an application for judicial review filed by the Forum des maires de la Péninsule acadienne Inc. (hereinafter the “applicant”) challenging a decision of the Minister of Justice and Public Safety (hereinafter the “respondent”) involving changes made to court services in the Judicial District of Bathurst, namely the closure of the Caraquet courthouse, the conversion of the Tracadie courthouse into a satellite court and the transfer of two judges to Bathurst and Miramichi (hereinafter the “decision”)

[...]

[18]      The applicant does not deny that by closing the two courthouses, the provincial government was able to better allocate its resources. The issue is rather whether, in making this decision, the Minister fulfilled his obligations in accordance with the language rights set out in the Charter and the relevant legislation. The applicant argues that he did not. It submits that, at the very least, the Minister should have considered the impact of his decision on the Francophone community, not in terms of access to services in French, but rather in terms of fulfilling his obligation to promote the cultural, economic, educational, and social development of the Francophone minority.

[...]

[72]       In the instant case, in order to determine whether the impugned decision engages values underlying language rights, it is necessary to consider exactly what those values are. The process involves keeping in mind the principles set out in R. v. Beaulac, 1999 CanLII 684 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, which require courts to interpret language rights broadly and generously. The Supreme Court, under the pen of Bastarache J., stated as follows, at paragraph 25:

25   Language rights must in all cases be interpreted purposively, in a manner consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in Canada; see Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), supra, at p. 850. To the extent that Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick, supra, at pp. 579-80, stands for a restrictive interpretation of language rights, it is to be rejected. The fear that a liberal interpretation of language rights will make provinces less willing to become involved in the geographical extension of those rights is inconsistent with the requirement that language rights be interpreted as a fundamental tool for the preservation and protection of official language communities where they do apply. It is also useful to re-affirm here that language rights are a particular kind of right, distinct from the principles of fundamental justice. They have a different purpose and a different origin. I will return to this point later.

                                                                        [Emphasis in original.]

[73]       It is therefore from this perspective that I shall consider the values underlying language rights in Canada.

[74]       Firstly, language rights are described as remedial rights, which means that they are designed to address historical injustices or inequalities suffered by the linguistic minorities. These rights are also intended to promote linguistic diversity and preserve the cultural identity of the minority language communities. At paragraph 25 of Doucet-Boudreau, the Supreme Court stated as follows on the manner in which these remedial rights are to be interpreted:

25   Purposive interpretation means that remedies provisions must be interpreted in a way that provides “a full, effective and meaningful remedy for Charter violations” since “a right, no matter how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its breach” (Dunedin, supra, at paras. 19-20). A purposive approach to remedies in a Charter context gives modern vitality to the ancient maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium: where there is a right, there must be a remedy. More specifically, a purposive approach to remedies requires at least two things. First, the purpose of the right being protected must be promoted: courts must craft responsive remedies. Second, the purpose of the remedies provision must be promoted: courts must craft effective remedies.

                                                                        [Emphasis in original.]

T is a bilingual Francophone who was convicted of sexual assault following a trial conducted in English. During the judicial process leading to the conviction, the judge before whom T first appeared did not ensure that he was advised of his right to be tried in French, contrary to the requirements of s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code. Before the Court of Appeal, T asserted that he would have liked his trial to be conducted in French. While the Court of Appeal was of the view that the breach of s. 530(3) was an error of law under s. 686(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, it found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the error had caused any prejudice. It therefore applied one of the curative provisos in s. 686(1)(b).


Held (Karakatsanis and Martin JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed, the conviction quashed and a new trial in French ordered.


Institutional judicial bilingualism ensures equal access to the courts for members of Canada’s linguistic communities through various legal guarantees, including those set out in s. 530 of the Criminal Code. Section 530, a provision enacted to advance the equality of status or use of English and French, goes beyond the constitutional right to speak in the official language of one’s choice. It also gives every accused the right to choose the official language they wish to speak and in which they wish to be understood by the judge or the judge and jury, without the use of interpretation or translation services.

[1] The Greater Toronto Airports Authority [GTAA] is a non-profit corporation that operates Toronto Pearson International Airport [the Airport], among other things. The applicant, Michel Thibodeau, who is not represented by counsel, is applying for remedies under subsection 77(1) of the Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp) [the OLA], against the GTAA, alleging that it has failed to meet its language duties under the OLA and has therefore violated the language rights associated with those duties. The alleged violations are related to three complaints that he made to the Commissioner of Official Languages [the Commissioner] under section 55 of the OLA, namely one complaint in docket T-534-21 and two complaints in docket T-2013-19, with both matters being heard in succession on the same day. The Commissioner prepared investigation reports and made recommendations in relation to each of the complaints. In addition, in an order dated November 26, 2020, the Commissioner was granted intervener status in docket T-2013-19 only. The Commissioner did not intend to take a position on the merits of Mr. Thibodeau’s application; rather, the Commissioner’s objective was to present to the Court the principles of interpretation that apply to the Official Languages (Communications with and Services to the Public) Regulations, SOR/92-48 [the Regulations], in order to clearly delineate the scope of third-party contractor services under subsection 12(1) of the Regulations and the scope of airport authorities’ duties.

[...]

[81] In any event, since I have established that Mr. Thibodeau’s language rights have been infringed, the next step is to order an appropriate and just remedy under subsection 77(4) of the OLA. Remedies may also be based on subsection 24(1) of the Charter. Together, these provisions enable the Court, in the case of a violation of the Charter or the OLA, to grant the remedy it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances (Air Canada 2019 at para 60).

[...]

[100] To sum up, whether under the Charter, the OLA or its Regulations, a purposive interpretation of the remedies to be granted in the context of violations of language rights breathes life into the age-old maxim ubi jus ibi remedium: where there is a right, there is a remedy. This is why it is important for the Court to make a clear pronouncement as to the just and appropriate remedy to be granted to Mr. Thibodeau. In so doing, it must “exercise a discretion based on [its] careful perception of the nature of the right and of the infringement, the facts of the case, and the application of the relevant legal principles”, having regard to the principles inherent to language rights (Doucet-Boudreau at para 52).

[1] The Association des juristes d’expression française du Nouveau-Brunswick [Association], the applicant in these proceedings, has applied to this Court for a remedy under section 77 of the Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4th supp) [Act]. The Association is challenging the decision of the Department of Justice Canada [Justice Canada or the Department] dated March 28, 2013, to eliminate the core funding it had been receiving since 2003 [Decision]. The Association is seeking the following remedies:
(a) A declaration that Justice Canada’s decision to eliminate the core funding the Association had been receiving since 2003 [Decision] was contrary to subsections 41(1) and 41(2) of the Act; and
(b) An order for damages payable to the Association for the amount of revenue lost thanks to the cancellation of core funding between April 1, 2014, and April 1, 2018, i.e. $340,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest of 7% per annum.


[2] Before the Court, the Association is arguing that (1) Justice Canada had a duty to consult the Official Language Minority Community [OLMC] of New Brunswick through the Association before making its decision, a duty arising from subsections 41(1) and 41(2) of the Act, as well as from the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages) v Canada (Employment and Social Development), 2022 FCA 14 [FFCB]; (2) Justice Canada breached its duty to consult; (3) the elimination of core funding had a negative impact on the vitality and development of the New Brunswick OLMC; (4) Justice Canada failed to mitigate these negative repercussions; and (5) appropriate and just remedies consist of a declaration by the Court and a payment of damages in the amount of $340,000.00.


[3] Justice Canada has replied that (1) subsection 41(1) of the Act does not create a duty; (2) the duty to take positive measures under subsection 41(2) of the Act confers discretion as to the choice of measures since (a) the “ratchet” principle has been rejected and (b) the duty does not include the duty to consult; (3) Justice Canada has complied with the duty set out in subsection 41(2) of the Act; and (4) the remedy sought, an award of damages, is not appropriate and just in the circumstances.


[4] In this case, the Court must consider whether the Association’s complaint is well-founded (FFCB at para 169 citing DesRochers v Canada (Industry), 2009 SCC 8 at para 35 [DesRochers SCC]; Canadian Food Inspection Agency v Forum des Maires de la Péninsule Acadienne, 2004 FCA 263 at paras 17, 20 [Forum des Maires]). The Association bears the burden of demonstrating that its complaint is well-founded.


[5] For the reasons set out below, the Court will dismiss the Association’s application for a remedy since it has not demonstrated that its complaint is well-founded. The Court concludes that (1) the Association has not demonstrated that Justice Canada had a duty to consult of the nature it pleaded; (2) Justice Canada has demonstrated that it listened and was attentive to the needs of the New Brunswick OLMC and the Association; (3) the evidence shows that the new measures were taken to enhance the vitality of the OLMC; (4) the evidence submitted by the Association does not demonstrate that the Decision had a negative impact on the vitality and development of the New Brunswick OLMC or on the Association; and (5) the evidence demonstrates that Justice Canada nonetheless took steps to mitigate any possible repercussions.

[515] La contestation s’organise ici autour de l’art. 23 de la Charte canadienne, un texte qu’il convient de reproduire en entier avant d’aborder l’étude qu’en fait le juge de première instance et les arguments qu’en tirent les parties qui l’invoquent. 23. (1) Les citoyens canadiens : a) dont la première langue apprise et encore comprise est celle de la minorité francophone ou anglophone de la province où ils résident, b) qui ont reçu leur instruction, au niveau primaire, en français ou en anglais au Canada et qui résident dans une province où la langue dans laquelle ils ont reçu cette instruction est celle de la minorité francophone ou anglophone de la province, ont, dans l’un ou l’autre cas, le droit d’y faire instruire leurs enfants, aux niveaux primaire et secondaire, dans cette langue. (2) Les citoyens canadiens dont un enfant a reçu ou reçoit son instruction, au niveau primaire ou secondaire, en français ou en anglais au Canada ont le droit de faire instruire tous leurs enfants, aux niveaux primaire et secondaire, dans la langue de cette instruction. (3) Le droit reconnu aux citoyens canadiens par les paragraphes (1) et (2) de faire instruire leurs enfants, aux niveaux primaire et secondaire, dans la langue de la minorité francophone ou anglophone d’une province : a) s’exerce partout dans la province où le nombre des enfants des citoyens qui ont ce droit est suffisant pour justifier à leur endroit la prestation, sur les fonds publics, de l’instruction dans la langue de la minorité; b) comprend, lorsque le nombre de ces enfants le justifie, le droit de les faire instruire dans des établissements d’enseignement de la minorité linguistique finan­cés sur les fonds publics. 23. (1) Citizens of Canada (a) whose first language learned and still understood is that of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province in which they reside, or (b) who have received their primary school instruction in Canada in English or French and reside in a province where the language in which they received that instruction is the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province, have the right to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in that language in that province. (2) Citizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving primary or secondary school instruction in English or French in Canada, have the right to have all their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the same language. (3) The right of citizens of Canada under subsections (1) and (2) to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of a province (a) applies wherever in the province the number of children of citizens who have such a right is sufficient to warrant the provision to them out of public funds of minority language instruction; and (b) includes, where the number of those children so warrants, the right to have them receive that instruction in minority language educational facilities provided out of public funds. Il suffit de lire une seule fois le texte de l’art. 23 de la Charte canadienne pour qu’un constat s’impose immédiatement à l’esprit : par la spécificité de ses clauses, cet article se distingue avec netteté de presque tous ceux qui, dans cette charte, sont énonciateurs de droits fondamentaux.

[516] Par ailleurs, on sait aussi que l’al. 23(1)a) est inapplicable au Québec[524].

[1] The applicant, Michel Thibodeau, who is self-represented, is applying for a series of remedies pursuant to subsection 77(1) of the Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4^th Supp) [Act], in particular and amongst other things, a declaration by this Court that Public Services and Procurement Canada [PSPC] breached its language obligations under the Act, thus violating his language rights, as regards the 13 complaints he filed with the Commissioner of Official Languages [Commissioner]; a formal letter of apology acknowledging the several language rights violations; as well as an award of $19 500 in damages — $1500 for each of the 13 violations in question — plus costs and disbursements. In addition, Mr. Thibodeau asks that he be granted public interest standing.

[...]

[5] In 2019, Mr. Thibodeau filed a series of 13 complaints with the Commissioner against PSPC regarding unilingual and/or predominantly English signage

[...]

[6] The 13 complaints involved sites which PSPC managed and on which it was responsible for ensuring that signage was in both official languages and of equal quality at all times, in particular Parliament Hill (six complaints), the Confederation Building (one complaint), the Library and Archives Canada building and the C.D. Howe Building (three complaints), and L’Esplanade Laurier building (three complaints). The signage in question primarily addressed health, safety and security on the premises, and traffic

[...]

[21]      Translation is a necessity in Canadian criminal trials when an accused person or a witness does not speak the official language in which the accused elects to proceed. Translation might be convenient for one or another participant in a trial but the necessity to provide translation does not serve the convenience of any participant.^[24] It serves the paramount, if not exclusive, interest that is expressed in the choice of the accused.^[25]The Court affirmed in Beaulac^[26] that the guarantee of linguistic choice in an official language has an independent value that is distinct from considerations of procedural fairness. Tayo Tompouba reiterates this affirmation.^[27] This has led Canadian courts to affirm that the rights of linguistic choice ensured by the Criminal Code are virtually absolute.^[28]

[22]      The priority afforded to the interest and choice of the accused is an essential element of that person’s right to make full answer and defence. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, for that right to be effective if the accused cannot understand the proceedings at trial in an official language of his or her choice. Language is the medium of intelligence that is essential to any concept of full answer and defence. Without it the accused cannot meaningfully be present at trial.^[29] Without the benefit of language, the accused cannot be expected to meet the prosecution’s case, cannot competently instruct counsel or make informed choices about the conduct of the proceedings. In those circumstances the accused is not present at the trial.^[30]

[23]      The fundamental purpose of the right to trial in the official language of choice is to ensure that the accused understands the proceedings in the official language of choice with respect to any issue and any aspect of the trial that could affect the disposition of the case.^[31] This right of choice is vital to understanding the case for the prosecution from beginning to end, the options of the defence, the evidence, interlocutory questions, objections, submissions and the possibility of appeal – among other matters. It seeks to ensure that the accused can understand relevant information and effectively communicate information to others.

[24]      Section 530 guarantees the right of the accused to choose whether a trial will be conducted in one official language or both languages. That right of choice belongs to the accused and to no other participant in the trial.^[32] That right must be exercised by the accused and not by counsel or the trial judge. Convenience and expediency are not reasons that can compromise this right.^[33]

[25]      The choice of the language of trial is a preliminary matter that must be resolved to ensure the fullest understanding of the proceedings according to the choice of the accused. Section 530(1) provides that the election is made “[o]n application of the accused.” Section 530(3) and 530(4) make clear that the court shall inform the accused of the choice that he or she may make and that the court may make an order in the interests of justice for the benefit of the accused in the absence of an application. There is jurisprudence that a formal application is not necessary but if an application is made an order “shall be granted” that records the election.^[34] This jurisprudence might remain sustainable but after Tayo Tompouba the formal requirements for taking a valid election are necessary. The standard of strict compliance with section 530 that is announced in Tayo Tompouba concerning the role of the judge at the time of the election suggests strongly that the better practice in the absence of a formal application would be for the exchange between the judge and the accused to be recorded and for the election to be formally noted in the procès-verbal at the direction of the judge.

[26]      To meet the requirements of section 530 the court must be assured that the accused is informed of the election that may be made with respect to the language of trial and to that end the court must make an order that records the election. The court must be satisfied that the election is made personally by the accused.^[35] This can only be achieved by an exchange between the judge and the accused,^[36] whether or not the accused is represented by counsel.^[37] The court must also be satisfied that the accused is informed of the consequences of the election that are enumerated in section 530.1. Section 530(3) imposes a continuing obligation on the court and although section 530(5) permits a subsequent variation of the initial election and order concerning the language of trial it is subject to the same requirements that the variation is an informed choice by the accused.

[27]      In Tayo Tompouba the Supreme Court emphasised the purpose of the linguistic rights guaranteed by section 530 of the Criminal Code^[38] and reiterated that their importance is distinct from considerations of procedural fairness or the constitutional protections afforded by section 14 of the Charter.^[39] The Court made clear three points in detail that will determine the present appeal. First, non-compliance with that provision of the Code is a ground of appeal against a finding of guilt. Second, non-compliance is presumptively an error of law and prejudicial to the accused if the breach is attributable to the judge before whom the accused appears and relates to the proceedings that resulted in a finding of guilt. Third, the prosecution cannot rely in appeal on a curative proviso to excuse the error of law unless it rebuts the presumption that the breach prejudiced the accused.

[28]      In the present case there were various breaches of the appellant’s linguistic rights under section 530 of the Code. The judge did not comply with section 530(3) because he failed to inform the appellant of those rights. He did not ask the appellant if he was aware of the guarantees provided by the Code, including the fundamental right to choose the official language of the trial. He allowed counsel, in the absence of the appellant, to elect for a trial in English but then allowed the trial to proceed in both official languages. In the absence of a timely express choice by the appellant, the judge did not subsequently raise the issue in accordance with section 530(4). What occurred in this trial was a convenient arrangement in which the services of the interpreter could be required if and when the accused signalled the need. As the judge noted in the preliminary discussions, the interpreter would be on stand-by and provide translation on a part-time basis.

[29]      The trial was not conducted in English. It proceeded in English and French in an exercise of compromise, convenience and accommodation. This occurred despite non-compliance with the requirements of sections 530. It also proceeded despite non-compliance by the judge and counsel with many requirements of section 530.1, which caused serious and substantial breaches of the appellant’s linguistic rights. The appellant made no application and the judge made no order for a bilingual trial. In these circumstances it is unnecessary to examine how translation would be provided to the appellant because he was not informed of the choice he was entitled to make.^[40]

[30]      The accused was not present during the preliminary exchanges before the presentation of evidence, including exchanges between counsel and court concerning arrangements for translation. There was no discussion with the accused himself concerning those arrangements or his level of understanding in French. There was no formal order to record the election of the accused to proceed under section 530 of the Criminal Code and only the prosecutor announced that the trial would be conducted in English.^[41] There is no discussion of equipment to record anything translated in the course of the trial. The prosecution case was presented entirely in French and the defence case entirely in English. At no point does the transcript disclose that the appellant interrupted either the testimony of a witness or any representations to seek the assistance of the interpreter. The transcripts include no translation in English of anything said in French or indeed anything said by the interpreter. At no point during the trial does the transcript show that the accused was asked if he understood anything said in French.

[31]      In short, non-compliance with section 530 of the Code is clear and must be characterized as an error of law that presumptively caused prejudice to the appellant.^[42]The judge did not explain the right or the consequences of the election in a direct exchange with the appellant, did not record the election, did not make an order for a trial in English in accordance with the appellant’s election or ensure that the trial was conducted in the appellant’s language of choice. This is not what the law allows. In these circumstances, the rights of the appellant under section 530 were not respected. What occurred must be characterized as an error of law that presumptively caused prejudice to the appellant.^[43]

[...]

Conclusion

[1]                                       This matter highlights the tension between an ideal and an imperative. Everyone agrees that the individual who is appointed Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick should ideally be fluent in both official languages of the province. This decision does not reject this ideal. Rather, it raises the specific question of whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of the Constitution Act, 1982 requires the personal bilingualism of the individual who is so appointed.

[2]                                       New Brunswick, the only officially bilingual province in Canada, is the setting for hard-won language rights that are entrenched in, and firmly protected by, our country’s Constitution.

[3]                                       This case does not call into question the fundamental principles set out in the leading case of R. v. Beaulac, 1999 CanLII 684 (CSC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768,[1999] S.C.J. No. 25 (QL), and applied in New Brunswick in cases such as R. v. Losier, 2011 NBCA 102, 380 N.B.R. (2d) 115, as well as in some of the decisions referred to therein. Language rights are unique. They go beyond mere procedural justice, as they are an essential means of ensuring the preservation and development of official language communities. They must be interpreted liberally in order to promote the protection and the equality of these communities in the province. As this Court noted in Losier (referring to R. v. McGraw, 2007 NBCA 11, 312 N.B.R. (2d) 142, at para. 35, Drapeau C.J.N.B. (as he then was), and Bujold v. R.,2011 NBCA 24, 369 N.B.R. (2d) 262, at para. 4), “language rights under the Charter are ʻinfrangibleʼ” (Losier, at para. 11). After all, the language rights granted in this province “set us apart in the Canadian federation” and are part of what “defines [us] as New Brunswickers” (McGraw, at para. 35).

[4]                                       The primary issue in this case is whether personal bilingualism is required on the part of the Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick. Nothing in our analysis should be interpreted as curtailing the language rights, privileges or obligations that are entrenched in Canada’s Constitution. In essence, the appeal involves determining whether the language provisions in the Charter require, explicitly or implicitly, that certain holders of public office, such as the Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick, personally have linguistic skills consistent with official bilingualism. Although it is desirable for such individuals to have such skills, our analysis brings us to the conclusion that the Charter does not, in fact, impose such a requirement.

[5]                                       We are therefore compelled to allow the appeal against the Court of Queen’s Bench’s (now the Court of King’s Bench) decision to the contrary. Moreover, our decision leads to the dismissal of a cross-appeal with respect to the remedies granted in the first decision.

[...]

[144]                               In sum, we agree with the application judge’s conclusion that the issues submitted are justiciable and subject to judicial review. However, we find that the application judge erred in focussing her analysis on the question of whether the fact the Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick is unilingual is incompatible with substantive equality without interpreting the specific wording of the relevant Charter provisions purposively.

[145]                               Subsection 20(2) confers upon the population of New Brunswick the right to communicate with the office of an institution of the legislature or government and the right to receive from the office of any of these institutions services in English or in French. It is not the right to [TRANSLATION] “speak” to the head of state or to the individual who personifies the institution or to otherwise communicate with him or her. As to the right to services, it refers to the right to receive, in English or in French, the services provided by the institutions rather than any service. Subsection 20(2) does not impose an obligation to appoint a Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick who is fluent in both official languages.

[146]                               Subsection 16(2) establishes equality of status, rights and privileges with respect to the “use” of English and French “in all institutions of the legislature and government of New Brunswick.” The use of both official languages “in” the institution pertaining to the Lieutenant Governor is not dependent upon the personal linguistic capabilities of that individual. The appointment of a unilingual Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick does not violate s. 16(2).

[147]                               The “distinct […] institutions” referred to in s. 16.1(1) do not correspond to the state institutions referred to in ss. 16(2) and 20(2). Section 16.1 cannot be interpreted as requiring that the Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick be bilingual.

[148]                               The language skills of the Lieutenant Governor have no effect on the realization of the purpose of s. 18(2). The judge did not err in finding that the appointment of a unilingual Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick does not violate s. 18(2).

[149]                               For these reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the application judgment. Further, we dismiss the cross-appeal. On agreement by the parties, there will be no award of costs.